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UID:397-39@berlinschoolofeconomics.de
CLASS: PUBLIC
SUMMARY:Research Seminar in Economics:  Robert Fenge (University of Rostock)
DESCRIPTION:Topic: Minimum wages and unemployment insurance in a federatio
 n of states\n\nSpeaker: Robert Fenge (University of Rostock) with Max Fr
 iese\n\nTime & venue:\n\nThursday, 12.15–1.30 p.m.\n\nFU Berlin, Boltzma
 nnstr. 16-20\n\nroom 202/ Kaminzimmer\n\nDescription: \n\nIn a federation
  of states with partial mobility of households and firms we analyze four d
 ifferent regimes of de(centralized) minimum wage setting and de(centralize
 d) unemployment insurance. Unemployment insurance is always efficient by d
 ecentral decisions. In contrast, for symmetric states minimum wages are se
 t efficiently only, if it is organized centrally. Decentralized minimum wa
 ge setting appears to be generically inefficient, because the decision mak
 ers either externalize the cost of unemployment via the pooled insurance b
 udget or exploit migrational externalities. Only with full mobility, the o
 pposing migration effects outweigh the pooling effect. Our results suggest
  that contrary to insurance which can be efficiently organized decentrally
 , a pure redistribution like minimum wages should be centralized.
DTSTAMP:20241107T134057Z
DTSTART:20241128T121500Z
DTEND:20241128T133000Z
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