Description:
This lecture covers the literature on information economics including: communication, information design, mechanism design, social learning, and experimentation. Exercises related to content from lecture, variants of models studied in lecture, discussion.
Learning objectives: The students have knowledge of the core models in theoretical information economics and an understanding of the current state of research in the field. They are able to apply methods and solution concepts from microeconomic theory to situations with asymmetric information: e.g. games of communication, social learning, experimentation, and the design of information and mechanisms.
Literature:
tba
Time & venue:
Lectures: Thursdays, 10:00-14:00; HU Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, room 23
Exam:
Exam and presentation (10-30 min) on a paper from the information economics literature (graded)
Willy Lefez
Dilip Ravindran
