Instructor:
Daniel Krähmer (University of Bonn)
Course description:
The course will cover the basic Bayesian persuasion and information design problem as well as selected topics as outlined below (subject to smaller changes).
1. Bayesian Persuasion
- Basic problem with one sender and one receiver
- Relationship between information structures and posterior beliefs
- Concavification
- BP as a linear problem
2. Information design with multiple receivers
- Myerson’s revelation principle
- Bayes’ correlated equilibrium
3. Information design in markets
- Market segmentation
- Buyer optimal information
- Information design in the hold-up problem
4. Information design and flexible moral hazard
- Flexible moral hazard
- Flexible moral hazard and screening
Literature:
- Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., & Morris, S. (2015). The limits of price discrimination. American Economic Review, 105(3), 921-957.
- Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2016). Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. Theoretical Economics, 11(2), 487-522.
- Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2019). Information design: A unified perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(1), 44-95.
- Condorelli, D., & Szentes, B. (2020). Information design in the holdup problem. Journal of Political Economy, 128(2), 681-709.
- Georgiadis, G., Ravid, D., & Szentes, B. (2024). Flexible moral hazard problems. Econometrica, 92(2), 387-409.
- Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2590-2615.
- Kolotilin, A. (2018). Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach. Theoretical Economics, 13(2), 607-635.
- Krähmer, D. (2025a). Optimal monopoly regulation with flexible investments. Mimeo.
- Krähmer, D. (2025a). The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable invesmtents. Mimeo.
- Myerson, R. B. (1982). Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems. Journal of mathematical economics, 10(1), 67-81.
- Roesler, A. K., & Szentes, B. (2017). Buyer-optimal learning and monopoly pricing. American Economic Review, 107(7), 2072-2080.
Time & venue:
September 22, 2025, 10:30-12:00 & 14:00-15:30; HU Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, room 23
September 23, 2025, 10:30-12:00 & 14:00-15:30; HU Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, room 22
September 24, 2025, 8:30-10:00, 10:30-12:00 & 14:00-15:30; HU Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, room 23
September 25, 2025, 10:30-12:00; HU Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, room 23
Registration:
For Berlin School of Economics students: Please register through our website until September 21, 2025.
For all others: Please send an email to bsoe.office@hu-berlin.de until September 21, 2025.
